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Abstract: 
This paper examines the effects of school curricula on subsequent preference 
formation. The estimation results, using Japanese data, show that the actual 
curriculum at public elementary schools varies widely from area to area and is 
associated with preference formation. Specifically, pupils who have experienced 
participatory/cooperative learning practices are more likely to be altruistic, 
cooperative with others, reciprocal, and have national pride. In contrast, the 
influence of education emphasizing more on anti-competitive practices is 
negatively associated with these attributes. Such contrasts can also be seen for 
other preferences regarding government policies and a market economy. The 
findings imply that elementary school education, as a place for early socialization, 
plays an important role in the formation of life-long social preferences. 
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The Hidden Curriculum and Social Preferences 
1. Introduction
An increasing number of social scientists are interested in how culture is 
transmitted between people within a society. In the so-called cultural transmission 
(or socialization) field, many studies have documented the socialization 
mechanisms of preferences, beliefs, and/or norms.1 Such mechanisms can be 
broadly classified into two channels: direct vertical socialization (through family) 
and horizontal and oblique socialization (through, for example, friends, neighbors, 
teachers, or mass media). Among the latter’s mechanisms, school education is 
considered an effective measure for social integration by promoting a common 
culture in society (Gradstein and Justman, 2005; Alesina and Reich, 2013). 
History also tells us that education has been a device to unify people in both the 
East and West.2 
Despite such academic interests and historical evidence, few empirical 
studies have identified the causal linkage between education and preference 
formation. This might be ascribable to empirical difficulties associated with the 
estimation of the causal impact of school education. For instance, when 
examining the role of educational content/practices, it is possible that the 
content/practices that the students receive at school are an endogenous outcome of 
1 See Bisin and Verdier (2011) for an extensive review of the literature in this field. 
2 A typical example is wartime education. See, for instance, Anderson (1959) for education in 
Japan during the Second World War. 
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their (or their parents’) school choice. This potential self-sorting makes it difficult 
to isolate the effects of school education. In addition, sufficient variation in 
educational content/practices might not be available in a particular country 
because school education content, especially at public schools, is usually 
regulated by a national education policy. In this case, distinguishing the effects of 
education from other macro factors is very difficult, unless education policy 
varies within a country or data covering multiple countries are available. 
Against this backdrop, however, several studies deal well with this 
difficulty. Algan et al. (2013) examined whether teaching practices at school 
affect students’ beliefs by exploiting within-school variations in educational 
practices using school-survey data covering multiple countries. They found a 
positive causal relationship between “working-in-groups” practices and students’ 
beliefs about cooperation and trust. Cantoni et al. (2014) utilized cohort-regional 
variations in educational content at senior high schools in China. They studied the 
role of school curricula upon students’ beliefs and found that changes in Politics 
curriculum alter students’ ideological beliefs. In addition, Aspachs-Bracon et al. 
(2008) and Clots-Figueras and Masella (2013) explored the effect of language 
education on national identity, exploiting reforms in language educational policies 
in an autonomous community in Spain. Their results indicate that language 
education exerts an influence on national identity formation.3 
                                                   
3 Some indirect evidence also exists regarding the role of educational content/practices. For 
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This paper also examines the causal impact of school curricula on the 
formation of preferences and beliefs, focusing on the “hidden curriculum.” The 
term “hidden curriculum” refers to beliefs, attitudes, or values that underlie 
educational content/practices, and which are transmitted to students consciously 
or subconsciously. In other words, the hidden curriculum is what mainly 
influences students’ non-cognitive or non-academic abilities and is usually 
contrasted with the official academic curriculum, which aims to develop students’ 
cognitive abilities such as literacy and numeracy.4  To examine the hidden 
curriculum’s influence on preference formation, we exploit “exogenous” 
variations in actual educational content/practices in Japanese elementary schools. 
In Japan, educational content/practices at elementary schools are 
stipulated by the curriculum guideline set out by the Japanese government, and all 
public schools aim to provide uniform education based on these guidelines. 
However, the actual curriculum, particularly the non-academic curriculum, differs 
with the area. This situation provides a desirable basis for identification. Because 
                                                                                                                                          
instance, several authors have found that number of years of education (quantity of 
schooling) is associated with civic participation (Milligan et al., 2004; and Helliwell and 
Putnam, 2007) or political preferences (Friedman et al., 2011). In addition, Hryshko et al. 
(2011) found a relationship between parents’ education and the risk attitude of their 
children. 
4 In education literature, the term “hidden curriculum” is not necessarily used in the same 
sense as our definition. For instance, some studies define hiddenness based on degree of 
intentionality. In this regard, however, the fact remains that the hidden curriculum, whether 
a clear intention underlies it or not, is related to non-cognitive/non-academic outcomes such 
as beliefs, attitudes, values, or norms (Giroux and Purpel, 1983; Kelly, 2009). In addition, 
from an empirical perspective, any non-cognitive education cannot be clearly identified 
whether it was set intentionally, or whether its results are exactly as intended. Therefore, 
our definition makes no distinction regarding the presence or the absence of intention. 
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people believe that curricula at public elementary schools are uniform, 
educational content/practices should not serve as a consideration for parents in 
choosing a school. In fact, as will be shown later, between-school disparities in 
academic achievements at elementary education are surprisingly smaller in Japan 
than in other developed countries, suggesting that Japanese public elementary 
schools offer a homogeneous academic curriculum. 
In addition, the similarity of educational content/practices across 
neighboring schools also reinforces the situation. In Japan, each prefectural 
education board in principle administers educational provision independently, and 
prefectural education boards have final approval in recruitment, transfer, and 
dismissal of all public school teachers and principals. As a consequence, actual 
educational content/practices become similar among neighboring schools in a 
prefecture, and this makes it difficult for parents to recognize that educational 
content/practices do in fact vary between schools. Furthermore, almost all 
elementary schools are operated publicly (about 99%), and a zoning rule that 
automatically assigns pupils to the school in their school district is strictly applied 
to all public elementary schools. Therefore, exploiting variations in actual 
educational content/practices within elementary education enables us to avoid a 
self-sorting problem and identify schooling’s effects on preference formation. 
In addition to the identification issue, this study contributes to the 
existing literature in three ways. First, the actual curriculum we explore includes a 
6 
 
wide range of educational content/practices: aside from group learning practices 
(Algan et al., 2013) and political education (Cantoni et al., 2014), other moral, 
character, peace, and economic lessons are also examined in our analysis. 
Furthermore, the outcomes in this study cover a broad range of social, economic, 
and political preferences/beliefs, including components of social capital such as 
beliefs in trust and cooperation, and reciprocity. Thus, this study can provide a 
better understanding of the role of education in socialization from a broad 
perspective. 
Second, we focus on educational content/practices during elementary 
education, whereas our main references, Algan et al. (2013) and Cantoni et al. 
(2014), documented evidence on the role of secondary education in socialization. 
Recently, non-cognitive skills such as attitudes, beliefs, and personalities have 
gained attention in the empirics of human capital theory, and several studies 
emphasize the importance of childhood in the formation of such skills. 5 
Therefore, stages of education also matter in preference formation, and 
elementary education, as an early stage of socialization, could play a decisive 
role. 
Third, this study examines people’s preference/belief formation years or 
decades after the completion of education, using a sample of people in their 20s to 
50s. Algan et al. (2013) quantified contemporaneous effects of teaching practices 
                                                   
5 For instance, James J. Heckman, among others, is a leading advocate for this view 
(Heckman and Krueger, 2003). 
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using a sample of early-teen students,6 and Cantoni et al. (2014) examined the 
influence of educational content at senior high schools on ideology among 
university students. Consequently, their works are completely silent on what 
would happen after completing education, after entering the labor market, or after 
gaining a wide variety of experience in life. Whether, and to what extent, the 
effect of education on preferences/beliefs persists is of high interest for 
policymakers as well as social scientists, and we tackle this question. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 describe 
educational content/practices in Japan and the dataset used in the analysis. Section 
4 presents the empirical framework and discusses the validity of its identification 
assumptions. Section 5 reports the estimation results, which show that great 
regional differences exist in actual educational content/practices in Japan, and that 
the actual curriculum has a non-negligible influence on social preference 
formation. In particular, education emphasizing participatory and cooperative 
learning is effective for cultivating positive social preferences, and various checks 
show that the findings are robust after eliminating possible confounding factors or 
potential reverse causality. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
                                                   
6 Algan et al. (2013) also conducted a cross-country macro analysis in which dependent 
variables are country-averaged values (the sample mainly comprises an adult population). 
However, because the teaching practices they exploited are those used for younger 
generations, their estimates might not capture the direct influences of past education on 
subsequent preference formation, and might also confound reverse causality between 
beliefs held by older generations and recent educational policies. 
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2. Educational Content and Practices in Japan 
The content and practices of school education in Japan are basically stipulated in 
the school curriculum. For elementary through high school, the curriculum is 
based on the School Curriculum Guidelines (Gakushu Sidou Youryou) of the 
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT). 7 
However, while all public schools seem to provide uniform education based on 
the same guidelines, actual educational content/practices are not identical. 
For instance, while elementary schools, almost without exception, hold a 
school sports meet every year in which pupils are separated into two teams and 
compete in several athletic sports, regional or generational differences exist in the 
actual activities. Usually, pupils compete in a 50-meter footrace with five or six 
peers, and some points are added to the teams of the pupils who win the first and 
second prizes. However, in some cities, there are no footraces at school sports 
meets. Even if there are footraces, teachers do not rank pupils’ finishing order. 
Another example is peace and anti-discrimination education. Almost all 
elementary schools in Japan offer a school trip for sixth-grade pupils, consisting 
of multi-day tours, to broaden their knowledge. In western Japan, the destination 
tends to be Hiroshima or Nagasaki (cities on which the atomic bombs were 
dropped) to learn the misery of war and importance of peace. Similarly, schools in 
western Japan tend to provide anti-discrimination education (dowa kyoiku) and 
                                                   
7 Private schools, as well as public schools, are supposed to follow the guidelines, but it is 
more strictly applied to public schools. 
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have school assemblies on the atomic bomb day (August 6 or 8). However, no 
such tendencies are found in other regions. 
Besides these practices, there are several region- or generation-specific 
content/practices, as listed in Table 1. In our original survey, as explained in the 
next subsection, we investigated people’s experience of these 17 
contents/practices. 
[Table 1] 
Note that we focus on these region- and generation-specific educational 
content/practices, not on nationwide content/practices, because it is impossible to 
identify the effects of a variable that exhibits no variation. This is merely a 
practical issue and does not mean that such nationwide practices are of no 
importance. For instance, greetings while saying “Stand up. Bow. Sit down.” 
before/after class and everyday school cleaning by pupils8 as well as the school 
sports meets and school trips are well-known nationwide content/practices in 
Japan and definitely have an influence on pupils’ socialization. A cross-country 
analysis focusing on such nation-specific educational content/practices may 
provide interesting insights, enabling us to investigate differences in national 
character or culture, but such a task is beyond the scope of this study. 
                                                   
8 Greetings before/after class are a sequence of actions that pupils perform, such as standing 
up, bowing, and sitting down to show their respect for teachers. Daily school cleaning by 
students is also a common practice in Japanese schools. Usually, students clean their 
classroom, school playground, or gymnasium for about 20 minutes before afternoon classes 
every day. 
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3. Data 
To investigate people’s experiences of school education and determine their 
preferences and beliefs, we carried out an original survey in October 2012. The 
survey was conducted online by a Japanese market research company9 under the 
author’s directions. Given the size of our research budget, we set the target 
number of respondents as 4,500. Then, considering average response rates, the 
survey company sent invitation e-mails to 14,628 panelists. To ensure sufficient 
variations among respondents’ past educational experiences, we employed 
quota-sampling based on age, gender, and region (five age categories, two 
genders, and nine regions),10 and we obtained 4,709 survey responses. In the 
analysis, we use a sampling weight so that our sample’s age-gender-region 
distribution is proportional to the actual age-gender-region distribution in Japan. 
The actual distribution of the Japanese population is calculated from the 2010 
Population Census of Japan. 
Table 2 reports sample features such as marital status and education level. 
                                                   
9 The survey company is MyVoice Communications Inc. It started undertaking Internet 
surveys in 1998 and had more than one million registered survey panelists as of November 
2013. It has a rigorous data quality control system to obtain highly reliable data. For 
instance, all registrants are checked strictly by examining their registration information, 
and about one-fourth of new registrants are eliminated beforehand due to inconsistent 
characteristics or double registration. In addition, the survey panelists are regularly 
monitored, and the number of surveys in which one panelist can participate is controlled 
(average frequency in one year is about 13). 
10 The nine regions comprise Hokkaido, Tohoku, Kanto, Hokuriku, Chubu, Kinki, Chugoku, 
Shikoku, and Kyushu. 
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The table also presents the same information calculated from national 
representative data for comparison (Panel B). As can be seen from the table, 
respondents in our survey are more likely to have a college degree (or higher) 
than Labor Force Survey respondents. This is because our survey was conducted 
online, and highly educated people have a high tendency to use the Web 
frequently. In particular, elderly cohorts seem to be more skewed toward the 
highly educated. 
In our empirical analysis, out of the 4,709 respondents, 894 individuals 
aged 60 and older were excluded. This is partly due to the sample bias concern 
mentioned above, but mainly due to their educational background: individuals 
aged 60 and older received their elementary education in wartime or postwar 
turmoil. The education system has changed significantly during the postwar 
occupation by the Allied Powers (1945–1952). In addition, 125 respondents who 
graduated from a private elementary school (3.3% of the sample) and 69 
respondents with missing information on some characteristics (1.8%) were also 
excluded from the analysis. Thus, the sample used in the analysis consists of 
3,621 respondents. 
[Table 2] 
Regarding the content of school education, respondents were asked 
whether they had experienced the 17 educational contents/practices shown in 
Table 1. These contents/practices have been employed in some regions (for some 
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generations) but not in other regions (for other generations), and the regional 
(generational) disparities are considered to reflect differences in the actual 
curriculum. 
It should also be mentioned that a non-negligible number of respondents 
answered “do not remember,” as shown in the table. However, this may not be a 
serious problem. The contents/practices with high rates of “do not remember” 
answers are those with large regional differences. For example, “school assembly 
on atomic bomb day” is practiced mainly in western Japan. This is because 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki are in western Japan, and the school assembly is held 
during summer vacation to prevent the terrible lessons of the war from being 
forgotten. Therefore, memories of the school assembly are strongly connected 
with the date for those who experienced it. Likewise, “emergency drill on 
September 1” is associated with the Great Kanto Earthquake, which struck on 
September 1, 1923, and therefore it is mainly practiced in eastern Japan, including 
the Kanto region. Thus, answering “do not remember” to a content/practice 
reflects the fact that the respondent received education that placed less emphasis 
on such content/practice. Therefore, it is reasonable enough to have more than a 
few respondents answering “do not remember” to such contents/practices, and 
thus treating “do not remember” the same as “No” seems highly plausible. The 
potential problem due to such answers will be discussed further in Section 5.2. 
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4. Empirical Framework 
4.1. Empirical Specification 
In the analysis, we quantify the impacts of the hidden curriculum of elementary 
school education (ࡴ࡯௜) on the subsequent formation of social preferences (ܲݎ݁ ௜݂). 
Specifically, we estimate 
(1)             ܲݎ݁ ௜݂ ൌ ߙ ൅ ࡴ࡯௜ࢼ ൅ ࢄ௜ࢽ ൅	ߝ௜, 
where i indexes individuals, ࢄ௜ is a vector of controls (individual, household, 
and community/school characteristics), ߝ௜ is an unobserved component affecting 
preference formation, and ߙ, ࢼ, and ࢽ are the parameters to be estimated. 
The outcomes of interest are social preferences (ܲݎ݁ ௜݂) such as altruism, 
beliefs in cooperation and trust, and reciprocity. These variables range from one to 
five, based on respondents’ answers to the standard questions to measure these 
preferences/beliefs (see Table A1). 
Regarding the hidden curriculum (ࡴ࡯௜), we employ factor analysis to 
extract factors comprising the hidden curriculum that lie behind actual educational 
content/practices. The result is shown in Table 3: reported figures are rotated 
factor loadings obtained by polychoric factor analysis using the principle 
component factor (PCF) method with an orthogonal Varimax rotation. 
Considering the Kaiser criterion and the Scree test, five factors are retained. The 
sensitivity of analysis for the measurement of the hidden curriculum will be 
checked in Section 5.2. 
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[Table 3] 
The first factor has large loadings for “no display of the national flag” 
and “no singing of the national anthem.” These practices are thought to be based 
on reflection of the last world war and to be associated with leftist political 
thoughts such as anti-war and anti-nationalism. “Teachers’ strike” is also 
associated with leftist thoughts. Thus, the first factor is referred to as “leftist 
political thought.” The second factor is strongly related to “no footrace” and “no 
finishing order.” These practices aim to turn pupils away from competition, and 
therefore we call this factor “anti-competition.” The third factor mainly consists 
of “group learning,” “reading before class,” “emergency drill on September 1,” 
and “target-based evaluation.” We refer to it as “participation & cooperation,” 
because most of these contents/practices require pupils’ active participation and/or 
cooperation among pupils. Regarding “target-based evaluation,” it often includes 
pupils’ behaviors such as compassion toward others and cooperation with others, 
as well as academic achievement, in the list of evaluation items. The fourth factor 
is related to “Kolkhoz and Sovkhoz,” “scale evaluation,” “kid’s bank,” and “statue 
of hard work.” Because these educational contents/practices aim to teach the 
importance of industriousness, we call this factor “hard work & effort.” The final 
factor is strongly related to “anti-discrimination education,” “school trip to 
Hiroshima or Nagasaki,” and “school assembly on atomic bomb day,” and is 
referred to as “human rights & peace.” Note that “gender-segregated class number” 
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has small factor loadings for all five factors. Segregating by gender is related to 
traditional Japanese thought, and this might be the reason why this practice has a 
relatively large positive loading for Factor 4 (“hard work & effort”) and negative 
loading for Factor 2 (“anti-competition”) because industriousness is also related to 
traditional values in Japan. 
Figure 1 maps average scores of the five factors by prefecture. As seen in 
the figure, our proxies for the hidden curriculum vary widely between prefectures. 
While “leftist political thought” (Panel A), “anti-competition” (Panel B), and 
“hard work & effort” (Panel D) appear dispersed nationwide, both “participation 
& cooperation” (Panel C) and “human rights & peace” (Panel E) have a regional 
tendency whereby the former is more practiced in central Japan and the latter in 
western Japan. We also observe generational differences for some factors (Table 
4). For instance, Factor 4 (“hard work & effort”) varies from generation to 
generation: elder generations are more likely to receive education emphasizing 
“hard work & effort.” On the other hand, the average factor scores for Factor 3 
(“participation & cooperation”) are higher among younger generations. This 
implies that a nationwide shift of educational content/practices occurred from 
“hard work & effort” to “participation & cooperation.” 
[Figure 1] 
[Table 4] 
Regarding other controls ( ௜ܺ ) in Equation (1), guided by empirical 
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literature, we employ individual characteristics (five-year birth cohort dummies, 
education dummies, female dummy, interactions between the five-year birth 
cohort and education dummies, marital status dummies, income category 
dummies, and household size), family background (parents’ education dummies, 
number of books at home, dummies for living with grandparents at age 15, and 
number of siblings at age 15), school (or school district) characteristics (class size, 
dummy for experience of classroom chaos, dummy for teachers’ active 
intervention with bullying, and number of high schools that can be chosen in a 
school district),11 and prefecture dummies (current and at the age of 12). 
 
4.2. Identification Issues 
A key source of variation used to identify the effects of the hidden curriculum 
stems from the fact that actual educational content/practices that students 
experience at public elementary school are exogenous to them. This is mainly due 
to the following two reasons. 
First, in Japan, people believe that educational content/practices provided 
by public elementary schools are uniform, and hence they do not take educational 
content/practices into account when choosing a school. While this reflects the fact 
that all public schools are regulated by the same curriculum guidelines as 
mentioned in Section 2, it may also be due to the educational administration 
                                                   
11  Note that school (district) variables are retrospective data directly surveyed from 
respondents in the same survey. 
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system. In Japan, public schools are operated on a city/town/village basis in 
principle and are supervised by education boards (kyouiku iinkai). Education 
boards are organized at two levels (prefecture and city/town/village), and each 
prefectural education board has the final word on personnel affairs (recruitment, 
transfer, and dismissal) of all public school teachers and principals in the 
prefecture.12 In particular, all personnel transfers in a prefecture are made within 
a certain region of the prefecture, and therefore, actual educational 
content/practices in neighboring schools within the prefecture tend to be similar. 
As shown later in this section, this is confirmed by a simple test using our data. 
Thus, parents have great difficulty in recognizing the fact that educational 
content/practices do in fact vary from school to school. 
Second, parents generally have no choice over elementary schools in 
Japan, even if they observe differences in school curricula. This is due to the 
school district system (zoning rule): all school-age children can enter a public 
school without examination, but each district has only one public school and 
children must attend the only school in their school district. 13  Moreover, 
                                                   
12 The only exceptions are 12 major (government-decreed) cities, where city education 
boards have authority over personnel issues. 
13 In 1997, the Ministry of Education issued a notice that municipal education boards are 
allowed to relax the school districts and introduce a school choice system in elementary and 
junior high schools. As of 2013, about 16% of municipalities have adopted some sort of 
school choice system in elementary schools. In this regard, our sample consists of people in 
their 20s to 50s in 2012, and peopled aged 20 (and part of people aged 21) might enter 
elementary school under a new system. However, the municipalities that have adopted a 
school choice system by 1998 (the year of elementary school entrance for people aged 20 in 
our sample) account only for less than 3% of the total municipalities, and the policy change 
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competition based on entrance examinations generally starts from high school. 
While public schools constitute about 74% of high schools, 99% of elementary 
schools are publicly operated. As a consequence, it is very unlikely that parents 
select an elementary school in consideration of actual educational 
content/practices. 
However, for those unfamiliar with Japanese elementary education, it 
may sound far-fetched that educational content/practices students receive at 
school are not a result of self-selection. In many developed countries, the 
achievement gap between socioeconomic groups has been an issue of social 
concern. In Japan as well, various social scientists point out that the disparity in 
academic achievement among elementary students has been increasing. In this 
regard, however, this achievement gap is often attributed to differences in family 
backgrounds, rather than school education (Kariya and Shimizu, 2004; Shimizu, 
2007; and Matsuoka et al., 2014). In fact, between-school disparities in academic 
achievements at the elementary-education level are surprisingly small in Japan, 
compared with other developed countries (see Table A2 in Appendix II). 
Considering together with the fact that the percentage of people choosing a 
private school is negligible, self-sorting into elementary schools (and therefore 
educational content/practices) is very unlikely in our context. Thus, exploiting 
variations in the actual curriculum between elementary schools in Japan enables 
                                                                                                                                          
has little influence on our analysis. 
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us to avoid potential bias due to a self-sorting problem. 
On the other hand, we must also consider the possibility that our 
identification framework fails. One major concern is recall bias, which is a 
common pitfall when using retrospective data. A typical example is that more 
recent experiences might remain in respondents’ memory. Moreover, when people 
hold two conflicting cognitions, they might distort one to mitigate the dissonance 
from the other (issue of cognitive dissonance). In other words, there is a 
possibility that current preferences distort memories of the past. These issues 
potentially create another reverse causality problem.  
To check this possibility, we conducted a simple test. Given that the 
formation of preferences/beliefs is strongly affected by experience and 
environment, it is expected that those who migrated from their places of origin are 
more likely to change their preferences than those who stayed at their places of 
origin. This being true and given the issue of cognitive dissonance, answers on 
past school experience might differ between respondents with migration 
experience and those without such experience. Using the two-level nested 
analysis of variance (ANOVA), we compare factor scores between those who are 
still living in the prefecture where they lived at the age of 12, and those who have 
migrated out (Table 5). The “group” in the analysis is defined based on the 
prefecture respondents lived in at the age of 12, and the “subgroup” reflects 
whether the current prefecture is the same as the prefecture at the age of 12. 
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[Table 5] 
The table shows that for all five factors, the between-group (prefecture at 
the age of 12) variation in column 1 is always larger than the between-subgroup 
(same/different prefecture as/from that at the age of 12) variation in column 2, and 
the F statistic indicates rejection of the null hypothesis that no differences exist 
among factor scores between groups. In contrast, the between-subgroup variation 
in column 2 is close to the within-subgroup variation in column 3. These results 
have two important implications. First, the actual curriculum seems to differ 
greatly with each prefecture but not so much within prefectures. This is consistent 
with our previous arguments that parents and students do not observe differences 
in educational content/practices between neighboring schools within a prefecture. 
Second, living in a different prefecture from that at age 12 bears no relation to the 
past educational experience respondents reported, implying that memory 
distortion is less likely. This issue will be further checked in Section 5.2. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Effect of Education on Social Preferences 
We start by estimating the basic specification in Equation (1). Empirical variables 
used in the analysis are summarized in Table 6, and the estimation results are 
reported in Table 7. All estimations are implemented with ordinary least-squares 
(OLS) controlling individual characteristics, family background, school (school 
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district) characteristics, and prefecture dummies (current and at age 12), as 
explained in Section 4.2. In addition, we adjust the sampling weight to make our 
observations proportional to the overall Japanese population distribution. 
[Table 6] 
[Table 7] 
From the estimation results, we see sharp contrasts between 
“anti-competition” (row 2) and “participation & cooperation” (row 3). T hose who 
experienced education that implemented participatory/cooperative learning 
practices are more likely to favor altruistic behavior (column 1), cooperation with 
others (columns 2 and 3), and reciprocal behavior (column 6). On the other hand, 
those who experienced education that implemented anti-competitive practices are 
less likely to favor altruistic behavior (column 1), cooperation with others 
(column 2), and reciprocal behavior (column 6). Interestingly, the sign of the 
coefficient differs between the case of positive reciprocity (column 6) and 
negative reciprocity (column 7), suggesting that those who experienced 
anti-competitive education prefer to not repay an obligation but to make a 
countercharge. In addition, a contrast between the two can be seen in the result for 
“national pride” (the last column): “anti-competition” is negatively associated 
with national pride, whereas “participation & cooperation” is positively associated 
with it. 
Regarding the magnitude of these influences, coefficient estimates show 
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that an increase by one standard deviation in “anti-competition” decreases scores 
of “altruism” by 0.032 (4.2% of the standard deviation), “cooperation: outcome” 
by 0.031 (4.3%), and “positive reciprocity” by 0.048 (6.6%); and that an increase 
by one standard deviation in “participation & cooperation” increases the scores of 
“altruism” by 0.086 (11.2% of the standard deviation), “cooperation: outcome” by 
0.042 (5.8%), “cooperation: satisfaction” by 0.061 (7.6%), and “positive 
reciprocity” by 0.041 (5.7%). For comparison, coefficient estimates on the 
dummy for college graduates aged between 20 and 24 (not reported here) indicate 
that there are about 0.3- to 0.6-point statistically significant differences in the 
scores of these social preferences between junior high-school graduates (reference 
group) and college graduates, holding other characteristics constant. Thus, the 
effects of a standard deviation increase in “participation & cooperation” are 
approximately one-eleventh to one-fifth of these influences, implying relatively 
small effects of the hidden curriculum. However, in comparison with the results of 
Algan et al. (2013), our estimates are not too small; rather, they show that an 
increase in the “students work in groups” variable by one standard deviation 
increases the belief in cooperation among students by about 2% of the standard 
deviation. 
Regarding the results for “anti-competition,” one might wonder why it 
has the opposite influence from that of “participation & cooperation,” even 
though they seemingly aim at a similar goal, i.e., egalitarian education. In this 
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regard, Kariya (1995) pointed out that in “anti-competition” education, the rank of 
pupils’ achievements in the class or school is not revealed to pupils because 
differences in pupils’ achievements are considered to be attributed to differences 
in teachers’ teaching skills rather than differences in pupils’ natural abilities. In 
this case, pupils who had anti-competitive education tend to think that people are 
equal in terms of natural ability and that performing poorly should be attributed to 
laziness or lack of effort. As a consequence, anti-competitive education may lead 
people to value self-responsibility and be less concerned about others. 
Another explanation can be provided in terms of self-esteem. In the 
United States, fostering self-esteem has become a major concern in school or at 
home based upon the belief that self-esteem causes positive outcomes including a 
rise in academic performance and better social development. However, several 
studies have found contradictory results: high self-esteem does not improve 
grades or career achievement nor does it reinforce pro-social behavior 
(Baumeister et al., 2003). Given that practices such as not declaring a winner in a 
footrace lead to pupils boosting their self-esteem by giving trophies for 
participation instead of for winning, inflated belief in own superiority may lead to 
an uncooperative and nonreciprocal individual, as indeed found in the results 
given in Table 7. 
Turning to the other factors of the hidden curriculum, the coefficient 
estimates are statistically insignificant except for the effect of “hard work & effort” 
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on “cooperation: satisfaction” (row 4, column 3) and the effect of “human rights 
& peace” on “competition” (row 5, column 4). This may not necessarily imply 
that these factors do not affect the formation of preferences and beliefs. Instead, it 
may be a result of a lack of variation after eliminating birth cohort or prefecture 
fixed effects. 
 
5.2. Robustness Checks and Discussion 
To check the possibility that the coefficients on the hidden curriculum confound 
other mechanisms, we run several estimations employing different specifications. 
For reasons of space, we report only the results for the impacts of “participation & 
cooperation” and “anti-competition” on altruism (column 1), beliefs in 
cooperation (columns 2 and 3), and reciprocity (columns 4 and 5). This is because 
Table 7 shows striking contrasts between the two factors regarding the impact on 
these preferences and beliefs. 
First, in addition to the explanatory variables already controlled for, 
versions of the School Curriculum Guideline are controlled. Since the end of the 
Second World War, the Ministry had revised the guidelines nine times (in 1947, 
1951, 1956, 1961, 1971, 1980, 1992, 2002, and 2011). These revisions to the 
guidelines might be correlated with the hidden curriculum, and omitting details of 
the specific guideline version might cause the coefficient estimates to be biased. 
Accordingly, we try several specifications including dummies for each version, or 
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years under each version of the guidelines. Estimation results of the specification 
with dummy variables (and their interactions with prefecture dummies at the age 
of 12) are presented in Panel A of Table 8. The results show that coefficient 
estimates remain virtually unchanged in magnitude. Thus, unobserved 
heterogeneity among generations due to the revision of the guidelines is less 
likely to influence our estimates. 
[Table 8] 
Second, as we saw in Table 1, more than a few respondents answered “do 
not remember” to several educational content/practices. If such forgetfulness 
occurs in a non-random manner due to recall bias, it is possible that our proxies 
for the hidden curriculum are correlated with unobserved individual preferences 
or beliefs. We check this possibility by estimating several specifications 
controlling for the percentage of “do not remember” answers to the 17 educational 
content/practices, or 17 dummy variables that take unity if the answer is “do not 
remember” and zero otherwise. Panel B shows estimation results based on the 
dummy variables’ specification. Although the statistical significance of some 
estimates disappears, the magnitude is almost unchanged. Thus, controlling for 
these variables does not affect our main findings. 
We conduct further checks for the possibility of recall bias. In Table A3 
in Appendix III, we run regressions where dependent variables are “do not 
remember” dummies, and explanatory variables are eight social preferences and 
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other controls (see Appendix III). If answering “do not remember” is associated 
with recall bias, we may observe that people with some kind of social preferences 
are more or less likely to answer “do not remember” to a specific educational 
content/practice. The estimation results, however, mostly show no evidence of the 
linkage between current preferences and “do not remember” answers. Even for 
the exceptions, no convincing evidence exists pointing to recall bias as a 
convincing explanation of our main findings in Table 7. Thus, it is unlikely that 
people intentionally forgot the educational content/practices they received, or that 
people strongly affected by an educational content/practice are more likely to 
remember that content/practice. 
Third, we check the sensitivity of our results to the measurement of the 
hidden curriculum. Panel C shows the results using group-averages of dummy 
variables on the 17 educational contents/practices. We divide the 17 educational 
content/practice dummies into several groups according to their correlation 
coefficients and calculate the average by group (see Appendix IV). Because the 
standard deviation of factor scores used in Table 7 is unity, the group-averages are 
also standardized so that their standard deviation becomes unity for ease of 
comparison. As can be seen from the results, the magnitude of coefficient 
estimates is remarkably stable. In addition, as shown in Appendix IV, employing 
polychoric factor analysis with the principle factor (PF) method instead of the 
PCF method used in Table 7 does not affect the results. Therefore, our findings 
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are not sensitive to the measurement of “hidden curriculum” variables. 
Fourth, to eliminate any influence of unobserved heterogeneity among 
municipalities within prefectures, we control city/county dummies (at the age of 
12). The results in Panel D show that coefficients on “anti-competition” shrink in 
size and in statistical significance. This might be due to a lack of variation after 
controlling city/county fixed effects because the city/county dummies may 
“over-control” for the variation in “anti-competition” within prefecture. However, 
the coefficient estimates for “participation & cooperation” are either almost 
unchanged or increase in magnitude, and contrasts still exist between 
“anti-competition” and “participation & cooperation.” Therefore, we conclude 
that unobserved heterogeneity within prefecture is less likely to influence our 
results. 
Fifth, we check for potential bias due to endogenous school choice. As 
already discussed in Section 4.2, parents are unlikely to consider the school 
curriculum when choosing a public elementary school. However, there may be 
another possibility wherein this is not the case. For example, after observing the 
school curriculum via the schooling of a first-born child, parents who consider 
this curriculum as unfavorable may move to a school in which a more preferred 
education is provided. In this case, our estimates are subject to having 
overestimated magnitudes. To check this possibility, we estimate the basic 
specification (as in Table 7) using the sub-sample of first-born people, a sample 
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size of 2,005. Given that education-related migration would occur after parental 
observation of the education that the first-born child received, the 
content/practices for children born later would be endogenous outcomes. 
Therefore, excluding the sub-sample of second- or later-born people may 
attenuate the coefficient estimates in size. The estimation results are reported in 
Panel E, showing that our estimates are mostly unchanged or rather increase in 
their magnitude. The statistical significance of some estimates diminishes, but this 
is mostly due to the decrease in the sample size. Thus, there is no evidence of bias 
due to endogenous school choice. Logical reasoning also implies that a 
self-sorting bias is unlikely. Assuming that our results are affected by endogenous 
school choice, this would mean parents must know exactly the influences of the 
hidden curriculum beforehand: positive effects of participatory/cooperative 
education on pro-social preferences and negative effects of anti-competitive 
education. However, it is not convincing to assume that people know exactly that 
seemingly similar educational practices, i.e., participatory/cooperative and 
anti-competitive practices, have opposite influences. 
Finally, we would like to mention the possibility of omitted variable bias 
due to unobserved teacher characteristics. One might doubt that unobserved 
teacher characteristics affect the selection of educational content/practices and 
that our estimates capture the influence of such teachers’ personal qualities rather 
than the hidden curriculum. Fundamentally, we do not rule out the possibility of 
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such influences through teachers because the hidden curriculum, as explained in 
Section 2, is considered to be based on preferences, beliefs, and/or norms of 
teachers, a school, or a community. 
At the same time, however, we believe that, in our context, it is unlikely 
that our estimates confound the influence of unobserved teacher characteristics for 
the following reasons. First, pupils do not have the same teacher for all years of 
primary education, and therefore, the influence of a particularly influential teacher 
would be “smoothed out” by teachers with different levels of influence in other 
years. In addition, an influential teacher would not have the same level of 
influence on all pupils in a class or year (i.e., what some people find engaging 
would not be the same for everyone else). Moreover, our educational 
content/practices used in the analysis (as listed in Table 1) cannot be determined 
at the class (teacher) level but at the school level. Given also that teachers (and 
pupils) cannot choose the schools in which they work (and in which to enroll), 
educational content/practices at schools are expected to be independent of 
teachers’ personal characteristics. In fact, Table 5 suggests that our proxies for the 
hidden curriculum vary by prefecture: within-prefecture variations are much 
smaller than between-prefecture variations. This is mainly due to the educational 
administration system in Japan, implying that actual educational content/practices 
are determined at some community level. Furthermore, our estimations in Tables 
7 and 8 include several controls that capture the quality of a teacher or a school 
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(school district), such as class size, dummies for experience with classroom chaos, 
teachers’ active intervention with bullying, and the number of high schools that 
can be chosen in a school district. We also control for current individual income 
level, which might partially capture the quality of education. Thus, our estimates 
are unlikely to suffer from unobserved teacher characteristics. 
 
5.3. Effect of Education on Economy-Related Preferences 
So far, we investigated the impact of the hidden curriculum on the formation of 
social preferences. The results indicate that participatory and cooperative 
education nurtures pupils’ social skills while anti-competitive education has the 
reverse effect.  
In this subsection, we further investigate whether the hidden curriculum affects 
economy-related preferences. 
Columns 1 to 5 of Table 9 report the results for preferences for 
government redistributive policy, and columns 6 to 8 report those for preferences 
for market institutions (see Tables A1 and 6 for the definitions of dependent 
variables and their summary statistic). The table shows that the hidden curriculum 
also influences the formation of economy-related preferences. Here again, we see 
a contrast between “participation & cooperation” and “anti-competition.” When 
“participation & cooperation” has a statistically significant positive coefficient, 
“anti-competition” has a negative coefficient, and when “anti-competition” has a 
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significant negative coefficient, “participation & cooperation” has a positive 
coefficient, except for the result in column 1. 
The results indicate that those who experienced participatory/cooperative 
learning (“participation & cooperation”) are more likely to approve of 
redistributive policies: they endorse government policies to impose heavier taxes 
on big companies and the rich (columns 3 and 4). In contrast, those who 
experienced anti-competitive education (“anti-competition”) are more likely to 
oppose government redistribution policies (column 1), social security (column 5), 
and the market economy (column 7). While the negative effect of 
“anti-competition” on the belief in the market economy (column 7) is plausible, 
the negative effect on redistributive policies (column 1) and social security 
(column 5) may be contrary to intuition because an anti-competitive view seems 
to be on the opposite side of inequality, which may be a result of market 
competition. However, in light of our results in Section 5.1, which indicate that 
anti-competitive education nurtures an asocial outlook, the results here can be 
interpretable. In this sense, the results in Table 9 are consistent with the results for 
social preferences given in Table 7. 
[Table 9] 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper examines the role of elementary school education in the formation of 
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social preferences. In the analysis, we extract proxy factors comprising the 
so-called “hidden curriculum” and investigate their impact on the formation of 
social preferences. Our main findings are summarized as follows. 
First, educational content/practices at public elementary school show 
great regional differences despite a national educational policy and curriculum. 
Although widely believed that public elementary schools in Japan provide 
undifferentiated education, schools in different areas in fact do employ different 
educational content/practices. Second, the hidden curriculum exerts a significant 
impact on pupils’ subsequent social preferences. In particular, education valuing 
student participation and cooperation is associated with positive social 
preferences: those who experienced participatory/cooperative learning practices 
are more likely to be altruistic, cooperative with others, reciprocal, and proud of 
their nationality. On the other hand, educational practices emphasizing 
anti-competition are associated with negative social preferences: those educated 
with anti-competitive practices are more likely to be non-altruistic, uncooperative 
with others, vengeful, and unpatriotic. 
On the whole, our results indicate that elementary school education plays 
an important role in the preference formation. Thus, in line with Algan et al. 
(2013) and Cantoni et al. (2014), this study provides evidence of 
horizontal/oblique socialization mechanisms through elementary education. 
Furthermore, our results indicate prolonged influences of elementary schooling on 
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subsequent preference formation, implying that education shapes the future of 
society through preference formation, not just through human capital formation. 
At the same time, however, this study is silent on the role of nationwide 
educational content/practices in Japan. To better understand the role of education 
in cultural transmission, further studies should be conducted. One direction would 
be to explore the causality between cross-national heterogeneity in educational 
content/practices and cultural diversity using a cross-national dataset with rich 
information on the school curriculum. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Informal Educational Content and Practices 
Content/Practices Statement in the questionnaire Yes Do not remember 
1) Reading before class There was time for reading before class. 0.272 0.189 
2) Statue of hard work There was a statue of Kinjiro Ninomiya reading a book while walking and carrying firewood on his back. 0.382 0.082 
3) School assembly on atomic bomb day August 6 or 9 during summer vacation was a school day.a) 0.245 0.427 
4) Gender-segregated class numbers Student class numbers (attendance numbers) were gender segregated.b) 0.619 0.165 
5) Teachers’ strike Sometimes, there was no classroom lesson due to a teachers’ strike. 0.118 0.149 
6) No display of national flag There was no display of the national flag at some entrance/graduation ceremonies. 0.065 0.252 
7) Kids’ bank The school had a kids’ bank (kodomo ginko).c) 0.108 0.113 
8) Emergency drill on September 1 The school conducted an emergency drill on September 1.d) 0.304 0.468 
9) Group learning There was a task in which students worked together as a group. 0.754 0.126 
10) Antidiscrimination education The school conducted antidiscrimination education (dowa kyoiku).e) 0.339 0.243 
11) No singing of national anthem There was no singing of the national anthem at some entrance/graduation ceremonies. 0.089 0.165 
12) Kolkhoz and Sovkhoz We studied Kolkhoz and Sovkhoz in a class.f) 0.265 0.250 
13) School trip to Hiroshima or Nagasaki We visited Hiroshima or Nagasaki on a school trip. 0.381 0.051 
14) Scale evaluation Educational achievement was evaluated on a several-point scale, e.g., on a scale of one to five. 0.715 0.059 
15) Target-based evaluation 
There were specific targets for achievement in each subject, and grades were evaluated on the 
basis of “achieved” or “not.” In addition to academic achievement, pupils’ behaviors such as 
compassion toward others and cooperation with others are also included in the list of 
evaluation items. 
0.437 0.198 
16) No footraces There were no footraces at school sports meets. 0.060 0.041 
17) No finishing order There were footraces at school sports meets, but teachers did not rank the finishing order. 0.020 0.054 
Notes: The order of educational content/practices is the same as in the questionnaire. a) August 6 and 9 are dates marking the dropping of atomic 
bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. b) Class (attendance) numbers are student ID numbers in a class, and when teachers call the roll of pupils, 
the order in which pupils’ name is called is based on the number. c) Kids’ bank (kodomo ginko) is a student-centric bank in which bankers 
come to school regularly and students can save/withdraw money to/from their accounts. It was established by the Finance Ministry and 
Education Ministry directly after the war to encourage students to learn the fundamental structure of the banking system. d) September 1 is the 
day on which the Great Kanto Earthquake occurred in 1923. e) Antidiscrimination education (dowa kyoiku) provides opportunities for students 
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to study discrimination against outcasts that dates back to the Edo era or before. f) Kolkhoz and Sovkhoz are collective farms in the Soviet era. 
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Table 2: Sample Characteristics 
A. Our survey (2012) Unmarried 
Graduates/ 
Post graduates 
Total (age 20 or older) 37.2% 47.5% 
Ages 20 to 24 94.5% 39.8% 
Ages 25 to 34 68.6% 55.3% 
Ages 35 to 44 37.4% 45.5% 
Ages 45 to 54 20.1% 45.6% 
Ages 55 to 64 9.3% 45.9% 
Age 65 or older 4.0% 37.7%  
B. Labor Force Survey (2012) Unmarried 
Graduates/ 
Post graduates 
Total (age 15 or older) 25.8% 20.9% 
Ages 15 to 24 96.5% 21.8% 
Ages 25 to 34 52.0% 34.4% 
Ages 35 to 44 22.8% 26.7% 
Ages 45 to 54 13.7% 25.8% 
Ages 55 to 64 7.9% 19.3% 
Age 65 or older 3.3% 9.0%  
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Table 3: Result of Polychoric Factor Analysis 
 
Factor 1: Leftist 
political thought
Factor 2: Anti- 
competition 
Factor 3: 
Participation & 
cooperation 
Factor 4: Hard 
work & effort 
Factor 5: 
Human rights & 
peace 
6) No display of national flag 0.921 0.146 0.052 0.046 0.105 
11) No singing of national anthem 0.898 0.107 −0.040 0.009 0.083 
5) Teachers’ strike 0.546 0.127 0.224 0.333 −0.022 
17) No finishing order 0.317 0.848 0.074 0.103 0.110 
16) No footraces 0.065 0.832 −0.027 0.006 0.071 
9) Group learning 0.033 −0.191 0.745 0.134 0.107 
1) Reading before class −0.024 0.225 0.689 −0.124 0.060 
8) Emergency drill on September 1 0.095 −0.010 0.628 0.066 −0.154 
15) Target-based evaluation 0.040 0.283 0.545 −0.067 −0.010 
12) Kolkhoz and Sovkhoz 0.202 −0.027 −0.126 0.701 −0.052 
7) Kids’ bank 0.009 0.333 0.156 0.643 0.063 
14) Scale evaluation 0.087 −0.093 −0.021 0.594 −0.060 
2) Statue of hard work −0.263 0.182 0.089 0.505 0.267 
10) Antidiscrimination education 0.184 0.055 0.021 0.022 0.777 
13) School trip to Hiroshima or Nagasaki 0.031 0.135 −0.040 −0.056 0.754 
3) School assembly on atomic bomb day 0.238 0.108 0.221 0.269 0.513 
4) Gender-segregated class number 0.157 −0.391 0.240 0.399 0.321 
Note: Reported figures are rotated factor loadings estimated by polychoric factor analysis using the PCF method with an orthogonal Varimax rotation. 
Shaded cells indicate a factor loading larger than 0.5. 
 
Table 4: Factor Scores by Age Group 
Age group: 20‒29 (N = 918) 30‒39 (N = 924) 40‒49 (N = 908) 50‒59 (N = 871) 
F1: Leftist political thought −0.102 0.092 0.075 0.033 
F2: Anti-competition −0.425 −0.870 −0.933 −0.810 
F3: Participation & cooperation 2.042 1.452 1.369 1.280 
F4: Hard work & effort 0.761 1.176 1.555 1.957 
F5: Human rights & peace 0.945 1.111 0.978 0.800 
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Table 5: Checks on Heterogeneity of the Hidden Curriculum between/within Prefectures 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Between groups 
(prefectures at the age 
of 12) 
Between subgroups 
(stayers/movers) 
within groups 
(prefectures at the age 
of 12) 
Within subgroups 
(stayers/movers) 
Total 
DoF 46 47 3,589 3,682 
Factor 1:  
 Leftist political thought 
MS 0.376*** 0.046 0.062 0.069 
F-stat. 6.05 0.75 
Factor 2:  
 Anti-competition 
MS 0.143*** 0.058 0.054 0.055 
F-stat. 2.66 1.08 
Factor 3:  
 Participation & cooperation 
MS 0.647*** 0.193 0.152 0.160 
F-stat. 4.24 1.27 
Factor 4:  
 Hard work & effort 
MS 0.296*** 0.120 0.138 0.143 
F-stat. 2.13 0.87 
Factor 5:  
 Human rights & peace 
MS 4.288*** 0.116 0.116 0.197 
F-stat. 36.89 0.99 
Note: “Group” is defined here as prefecture at the age of 12, and “subgroup” is defined on the basis of respondents’ current prefecture: 0 = current 
prefecture differs from the prefecture at the age of 12, 1 = otherwise. “DoF” stands for degree of freedom, “MS” stands for mean square, and 
“F-stat.” is F statistic. F statistic in column 1 tests the null that the mean squares in columns 1 and 3 are equal, and that in column 2 tests the 
null that the mean squares in columns 2 and 3 are equal. 
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Table 6: Summary of Statistics on Empirical Variables 
Variable NOBs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Altruism 3,621 3.581 0.768 1 5
Cooperation: outcome 3,621 3.421 0.728 1 5
Cooperation: satisfaction 3,621 3.414 0.805 1 5
Trust 3,621 2.952 0.868 1 5
Competition 3,621 2.922 0.87 1 5
Positive reciprocity 3,621 3.745 0.592 1 5
Negative reciprocity 3,621 2.723 0.774 1 5
National pride 3,621 3.69 0.883 1 5
Income redistribution: poor 3,621 3.184 0.861 1 5
Income redistribution: inequality 3,621 3.325 0.879 1 5
Government tax: companies 3,621 3.417 0.886 1 5
Government tax: wealthy individuals 3,621 3.823 0.931 1 5
Social security 3,621 3.732 0.843 1 5
Deregulation 3,621 3.370 0.782 1 5
Market economy 3,621 3.134 0.756 1 5
Labor union 3,621 3.350 0.883 1 5
F1: Leftist political thought 3,621 0.024 1 −1.725 4.589
F2: Anti-competition 3,621 −0.759 1 −2.797 4.584
F3: Participation & cooperation 3,621 1.54 1 −0.641 4.068
F4: Hard work & effort 3,621 1.354 1 −0.946 4.442
F5: Human rights & peace 3,621 0.961 1 −1.04 3.581
Age a) 3,621 39.534 10.881 20 59
Schooling years b) 3,621 14.37 2.123 9 21
Female dummy 3,621 0.501 0.5 0 1
Marital status dummies 
  Divorced 3,621 0.042
  Bereaved 3,621 0.004
  Unmarried 3,621 0.371
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Income (million yen) b) 3,419 273.062 293.118 0 1500
Household size b) 3,389 2.867 1.15 1 5
Father’s schooling years b) 3,089 12.387 2.703 9 21
Mother’s schooling years b) 3,107 11.799 2.032 9 21
# of books at home 
  50 to 99 books 3,621 0.122
  10 to 49 books 3,621 0.407
  1 to 9 books 3,621 0.152
  No books 3,621 0.019
  Do not remember 3,621 0.138
Living together with grandparents 
  Less than a year 3,621 0.027
  Less than 5 years 3,621 0.066
  Less than 10 years 3,621 0.058
  More than 10 years 3,621 0.284
# of elder siblings 3,621 0.601 0.795 0 6
# of younger siblings 3,621 0.742 0.769 0 7
Class size 3,621 36.043 8.094 1 80
# of high schools 
  2 to 4 schools 3,621 0.238
  5 to 9 schools 3,621 0.267
  More than 10 schools 3,621 0.146
  Do not remember 3,621 0.225
Class size 3,621 36.043 8.094 1 80
Classroom chaos 3,621 0.257
Teachers’ active intervention 3,621 0.263
Percentage of “do not remember” to the 17 
educational questions 
3,621 0.174 0.167 0 1
Note: a) “Age” is controlled as five-year age group dummies. b) All variables are 
controlled as dummy variables. In case of missing values, a dummy for 
missing values is controlled. 
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Table 7: Impacts of Hidden Curriculum on Social Preferences 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable:
Altruism 
Cooperation: 
outcome 
Cooperation: 
satisfaction 
Competition 
F1: Leftist political thought −0.008 −0.017 −0.014 0.003 
(0.016) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) 
F2: Anti-competition −0.032* −0.031* −0.023 −0.003 
(0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021) 
F3: Participation & cooperation 0.086*** 0.042** 0.061*** 0.023 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) 
F4: Hard work & effort 0.015 −0.019 −0.034* −0.014 
(0.020) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) 
F5: Human rights & peace −0.003 0.015 0.034 0.047* 
(0.020) (0.022) (0.024) (0.025) 
Observations 3,621 3,621 3,621 3,621 
R-squared 0.155 0.156 0.160 0.152 
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Table 7 (continued) 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable:
Trust Positive reciprocity
Negative 
reciprocity 
National pride 
F1: Leftist political thought −0.005 0.001 −0.028 −0.015 
(0.022) (0.017) (0.023) (0.024) 
F2: Anti-competition −0.001 −0.048*** 0.034* −0.049** 
(0.021) (0.016) (0.020) (0.024) 
F3: Participation & cooperation −0.005 0.041** 0.014 0.067** 
(0.027) (0.019) (0.019) (0.026) 
F4: Hard work & effort 0.037 0.009 0.022 0.012 
(0.023) (0.016) (0.019) (0.024) 
F5: Human rights & peace 0.015 0.016 −0.012 0.026 
(0.023) (0.016) (0.025) (0.023) 
Observations 3,621 3,621 3,621 3,621 
R-squared 0.158 0.199 0.152 0.164 
Note: “Hidden curriculum” variables are standardized to have a standard deviation of unity 
for ease of interpretation. All estimations are implemented by OLS with other 
controls such as five-year birth cohort dummies, education dummies, female dummy, 
interactions between birth cohort and education dummies, marital status dummies, 
income category dummies, household size, parents’ education dummies, number of 
books at home at school age, dummies for living with grandparents at the age of 15, 
number of siblings at the age of 15, class size at elementary school, dummies for 
experience with classroom chaos and teachers’ active intervention with bullying, 
number of high schools that can be chosen in a school district, and prefecture 
dummies (current and at the age of 12). In addition, we adjust the sampling weight to 
make our observations proportional to the overall Japanese population distribution. 
Numbers in parentheses are Huber-White robust standard errors clustered at 10-year 
age cohort, gender, and prefecture level. 
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Table 8: Robustness Checks on Impacts of Hidden Curriculum 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable: Altruism 
Cooperation: 
outcome 
Cooperation: 
satisfaction 
Positive 
reciprocity 
Negative 
reciprocity 
A) Eliminating unobserved heterogeneity among versions of the formal curriculum guideline 
F2: Anti-competition −0.032* −0.032* −0.023 −0.049*** 0.033* 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.016) (0.019) 
F3: Participation & 0.086*** 0.041** 0.060*** 0.041** 0.015 
        cooperation (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) 
B) Partialling out the possible effect of recall bias 
F2: Anti-competition −0.026 −0.040** −0.031 −0.042** 0.033 
(0.020) (0.018) (0.022) (0.017) (0.021) 
F3: Participation & 0.086*** 0.032 0.060** 0.056** 0.001 
        cooperation (0.024) (0.021) (0.026) (0.022) (0.025) 
C) Employing alternative “hidden curriculum” (group-averages of educational content/practice dummies)  
G2: Anti-competition −0.025 −0.042*** −0.016 −0.017 0.040** 
(0.018) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015) (0.017) 
G3: Participation & 0.092*** 0.049** 0.062*** 0.053*** 0.010 
        cooperation (0.020) (0.019) (0.022) (0.018) (0.019) 
D) Controlling municipality fixed effects 
F2: Anti-competition −0.030 −0.016 −0.030 −0.043** 0.027 
(0.020) (0.019) (0.022) (0.017) (0.020) 
F3: Participation & 0.097*** 0.067*** 0.091*** 0.055*** −0.009 
        cooperation (0.024) (0.018) (0.022) (0.018) (0.022) 
E) Checking bias due to endogenous school choice using the sample of first-born people (NOBs = 2,005) 
F2: Anti-competition −0.040* −0.025 −0.033 −0.048** 0.026 
(0.024) (0.025) (0.028) (0.022) (0.025) 
F3: Participation & 0.108*** 0.071*** 0.062** 0.081*** −0.004 
        cooperation (0.027) (0.026) (0.028) (0.025) (0.026) 
Note: See the note in Table 7. Taking the results in Table 7 as the base specification, we include 
additional controls in the estimations reported in Panels A through E. In Panel A, we include 
dummies for versions of the curriculum guideline and interactions with birth-cohort dummies. In 
Panel B, we include “do not remember” dummies for the 17 questions regarding educational 
content/practices. In Panel C, we employ alternative variables for the hidden curriculum (for the 
definitions of the variables, see Appendix IV). In Panel D, we include municipality (city/county) 
dummies (at the age of 12). In Panel E, we use the sub-sample of first-born people. 
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Table 9: Impacts of Hidden Curriculum on Preferences for Government Policies and Market Institutions 
Dependent variable: 
(1) Taking care of the poor 
(2) Reducing income 
inequality 
(3) Heavy taxes on big 
companies 
(4) Heavy taxes on the rich 
Leftist political thought −0.024 −0.019 −0.012 0.009 
(0.021) (0.025) (0.027) (0.021) 
Anti-competition −0.045** −0.008 −0.031 −0.012 
(0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) 
Participation & cooperation −0.004 0.023 0.057** 0.038* 
(0.021) (0.022) (0.026) (0.022) 
Hard work & effort 0.039* −0.030 −0.014 −0.021 
(0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) 
Human rights & peace −0.017 0.013 0.015 0.067*** 
(0.024) (0.031) (0.027) (0.025) 
Observations 3,621 3,621 3,621 3,621 
Adjusted R-squared 0.164 0.173 0.132 0.150 
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Table 9 (continued) 
  Redistributive policy: (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable: (5) Social security Deregulation Market economy Labor unions 
Leftist political thought 0.012 0.005 −0.017 0.035 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) 
Anti-competition −0.072 0.002 −0.047 −0.027 
(0.020)*** (0.021) (0.019)** (0.022) 
Participation & cooperation 0.020 0.019 0.006 0.000 
(0.022) (0.019) (0.020) (0.025) 
Hard work & effort −0.005 0.014 −0.021 0.016 
(0.023) (0.020) (0.019) (0.022) 
Human rights & peace −0.008 0.010 0.028 0.044* 
(0.026) (0.025) (0.023) (0.024) 
Observations 3,621 3,621 3,621 3,621 
Adjusted R-squared 0.152 0.152 0.146 0.129 
Note: See the note in Table 7. The control variables are the same as in Panel D of Table 8. 
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Figure 1: Factor Scores by Prefecture 
A) Leftist political thought 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B) Anti-competition 
 
 
C) Participation & cooperation 
 
D) Hard work & effort 
 
 
E) Human rights & peace 
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Appendix I: Empirical Variables 
The definitions of dependent variables are in Tables A1. 
[Table A1] 
 
Appendix II: Achievement Gap among Elementary Students between Schools 
Table A2 reports the results of the analysis of variance (ANOVA) for checking 
how large the between-school achievement gap during elementary education is in 
Japan. The data used in the analysis are test scores in mathematics and science for 
elementary students (fourth grade) from the Third International Mathematics and 
Science Study (TIMSS 1995). For comparison, results for the United States, 
England, and Norway are also reported. 
[Table A2] 
The table shows that between-school disparities in test scores are 
surprisingly small in Japan in both mathematics and science, compared with those 
in the United States and England. The mean square for “between schools” is about 
6 times larger than that for “within schools” in the United States, and 3 times 
larger in England. In contrast, the mean square for “between schools” is smaller 
than that for “within schools” in Japan. Notice also that the relative size of 
between-school variation in Japan is smaller than that in Norway, which is 
considered a country with one of the smallest education gaps. 
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Appendix III: Checks on Intentional Forgetting of Educational 
Content/Practices 
To address the recall bias issue, we run regressions where “do not remember” 
dummies are dependent variables and eight social preferences are now 
explanatory variables, controlling the percentage of “do not remember” answers 
to the other 16 educational content/practices, five year birth cohort dummies, 
prefecture dummies (at the age of 12), their interactions, female dummy, and 
education level dummies. 
In Table A3, we report the estimation results for the variables 
“anti-competition” and “participation & cooperation.” The results show no 
linkages between current stated preferences and “do not remember” answers for 
educational content/practices, aside from a couple of exceptions. Even for these 
exceptions, no convincing evidence arises that recall bias can explain our main 
findings in Table 7. Thus, it is less likely that people intentionally forget the 
educational content/practices they received, or that people who were more 
affected by educational content/practices are more likely to remember the 
content/practices. 
[Table A3] 
 
Appendix IV: Alternative Measures for the Hidden Curriculum 
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In Section 5.2, we use alternative “hidden curriculum” variables to check the 
robustness of our results. The first alternative measure is, as in Panel C of Table 8, 
group-averages of dummy variables on the 17 educational contents/practices: we 
divide the 17 educational content/practice dummies into several groups according 
to their (Pearson) correlation coefficients, and calculate the average by group. 
Correlation coefficients between the 17 dummy variables are reported in Table A4. 
Twelve out of 17 variables are classified into four groups based on whether the 
coefficient is greater than 0.15: the first group (“leftist political thought”) is 
educational content/practices (5), (6), and (11); the second (“anti-competition”) is 
(16) and (17); the third (“participation & cooperation”) is (1), (8), (9), and (15); 
and the fourth (“human rights & peace”) is (3), (10), and (13). Because five 
educational contents/practices (2), (4), (7), (12), and (14) are not classified into 
any group based on this criterion, these dummy variables are directly controlled in 
the estimation. 
[Table A4] 
The second alternative measure is the factor scores obtained by 
polychoric factor analysis with the principal factor (PF) method. In Table 7, we 
use the factor scores obtained by polychoric factor analysis with the PCF method, 
and the PF method is an alternative one. The result of polychoric factor analysis 
based on the PF method is reported in Table A5, indicating that the pattern of 
factor loadings is very similar to those derived by the PCF method as shown in 
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Table 3. Although estimation results using the factor scores based on the PF 
methods are not reported here (available from the authors on request), we also 
find similar results regarding the influences of the “hidden curriculum” variables 
as in Table 7, implying again that our main findings are not sensitive to the 
measurement of “hidden curriculum” variables.  
[Table A5] 
Summary statistics of these alternative measures are reported in Table A6. 
For ease of comparison, all variables are standardized to have a standard deviation 
of unity.  
[Table A6] 
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Tables in Appendix  
Table A1: Definitions of Dependent Variables 
Variable Statement in the questionnaire Answer 
Altruism I feel happy when I do a good deed that I think is beneficial for others (such as picking up trash in a park). 
1 (strongly 
disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree) 
Cooperation: outcome Working as a group results in greater achievements than working individually. 
Cooperation: satisfaction I am more satisfied when I achieve a goal by cooperating with others than only by myself. 
Competition I enjoy competing with others. 
Trust In general, you can trust most people. 
Positive reciprocity 
Average of answers to the following three questions: (1) If someone does me a favor, I am prepared to return it; 
(2) I go out of my way to help somebody who has been kind to me before; and (3) I am ready to undergo 
personal costs to help somebody who helped me before. 
Negative reciprocity 
Average of answers to the following three questions: (1) If somebody offends me, I will offend him/her back; 
(2) If somebody puts me in a difficult position, I will do the same to him/her; and (3) If I suffer a serious 
wrong, I will take revenge as soon as possible, no matter what the cost. 
National pride I am proud of being Japanese. 
Redistributive policy: 
Taking care of the poor It is the government’s responsibility to take care of those who cannot take care of themselves financially. 
Reducing income inequality It is the government’s responsibility to reduce the disparity between high-income and low-income individuals. 
Heavy taxes on big companies Government should impose a heavier tax on big companies. 
Heavy taxes on the rich Government should impose a heavier tax on high-income individuals. 
 
Social security 
Government should make maximum efforts to protect people against illness, injury, or unemployment by 
enhancing social security. 
Deregulation Government should actively promote privatization and deregulation. 
Market economy 
Although the economy regulated by market forces widens the income gap between the rich and the poor, it 
makes people wealthier in general. 
Labor unions Labor unions are not necessary. 
1 (strongly agree) 
to 5 (strongly 
disagree) 
Note: Regarding the definitions and measurements of positive and negative reciprocity, we follow Dohmen et al. (2009).
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Table A2: Disparities in Educational Achievements between/within Schools at Elementary Education 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mathematics Science 
  
Between 
schools  
Within 
schools 
Total 
Between 
schools  
Within 
schools 
Total 
Japan 
DoF 141 4,164 4,305 141 4,164 4,305 
MS 49.5 81.2 80.2 33.3 55.2 54.5 
F-stat. 0.61 0.60 
United 
States 
DoF 181 7,114 7,295 181 7,114 7,295 
MS 425.3 68.0 76.8 321.7 51.5 58.2 
F-stat. 6.26*** 6.24*** 
England 
DoF 126 2,999 3,125 126 2,999 3,125 
MS 190.2 63.9 69.0 130.5 53.6 56.7 
F-stat. 2.97*** 2.43*** 
Norway 
DoF 138 2,218 2,256 138 2,218 2,256 
MS 67.2 59.6 60.1 50.4 51.9 51.8 
F-stat. 1.13 0.97 
Note: “DoF” stands for degree of freedom, “MS” stands for mean square, and “F-stat.” is F statistic. F statistic tests the 
null that the mean square for “between schools” and that for “within schools” are equal. 
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Table A3: Checks on intentional forgetting 
Dep. Var.: Dummy for  
“do not remember” answer 
F2: Anti-competition F3: Participation & cooperation 
(1) E16:  
No footraces 
(2) E17: No 
finishing order
(3) E1: Reading 
before class 
(4) E8: Emergency 
drill 
(5) E9: Group 
learning 
(6) E15: Target- 
based evaluation 
Altruism 0.001 −0.005 0.006 −0.001 −0.013 −0.018 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.012) (0.014) (0.010) (0.012) 
Cooperation: outcome −0.001 0.001 −0.030** −0.003 −0.005 0.001 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.013) (0.015) (0.010) (0.012) 
Cooperation: satisfaction 0.003 0.006 −0.002 −0.007 −0.006 −0.012 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.011) (0.014) (0.008) (0.011) 
Competition −0.000 0.000 0.002 0.006 0.004 0.015 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008) (0.010) 
Trust 0.002 −0.004 0.012 −0.002 0.002 0.020** 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.012) (0.007) (0.010) 
Positive reciprocity −0.002 −0.006 −0.016 0.022 −0.005 −0.012 
(0.006) (0.008) (0.015) (0.019) (0.012) (0.014) 
Negative reciprocity 0.008 0.011* −0.015 −0.016 −0.003 −0.002 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.014) (0.009) (0.011) 
National pride 0.000 −0.007 0.005 −0.001 0.001 0.002 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008) (0.010) 
Ratio of “do not remember” 
answers 
0.386*** 0.434*** 0.772*** 1.099*** 0.788*** 0.822*** 
(0.046) (0.045) (0.056) (0.056) (0.045) (0.052) 
H଴: social preference variables have no effects 
F-statistic and p-value 0.41 (0.918) 0.85 (0.557) 1.69 (0.096) 0.37 (0.935) 0.78 (0.619) 1.57 (0.127) 
R-squared 0.341 0.330 0.298 0.330 0.320 0.301 
Note: All regressions are implemented by OLS with five-year birth cohort dummies, prefecture dummies (at the age of 
12), their interactions, female dummy, and education level dummies.  
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Table A4: Correlation Matrix of Dummy Variables for Educational Content/Practices 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
1) Reading before class 1.000 
2) Statue of hard work 0.060 1.000 
3) School assembly on 
atomic bomb day 
0.032 0.082 1.000
             
4) Gender-segregated class 
number 
0.017 0.101 0.115 1.000
            
5) Teachers’ strike 0.039 0.036 0.096 0.059 1.000
6) No display of national 
flag 
0.035 −0.004 0.091 0.043 0.181 1.000
          
7) Kids’ bank 0.043 0.143 0.101 0.075 0.080 0.061 1.000
8) Emergency drill on 
September 1 
0.115 0.036 0.085 0.074 0.060 0.014 0.070 1.000 
        
9) Group learning 0.198 0.055 0.072 0.121 0.060 −0.002 0.046 0.164 1.000
10) Antidiscrimination 
education 
0.026 0.106 0.179 0.092 0.016 0.075 0.063 0.026 0.115 1.000
      
11) No singing of national 
anthem 
−0.018 −0.044 0.069 0.047 0.165 0.530 0.023 0.032 0.008 0.053 1.000
     
12) Kolkhoz and Sovkhoz −0.097 0.100 0.061 0.117 0.149 0.079 0.126 0.004 0.034 0.049 0.080 1.000
13) School trip to Hiroshima
and Nagasaki 
0.038 0.048 0.154 0.034 −0.007 0.023 0.058 0.008 0.040 0.285 −0.010 0.001 1.000
   
14) Scale evaluation −0.052 0.088 0.026 0.097 0.030 0.015 0.075 0.018 0.041 −0.016 −0.009 0.138 0.024 1.000
15) Target-based evaluation 0.165 0.047 0.024 0.040 0.041 0.057 0.029 0.090 0.157 0.055 0.030 −0.014 0.016 −0.016 1.000
16) No footraces 0.043 0.017 0.028 −0.036 0.013 0.042 0.051 0.034 −0.009 0.029 0.045 −0.010 0.061 0.001 0.060 1.000 
17) No finishing order 0.041 0.033 0.068 −0.007 0.072 0.150 0.085 0.051 −0.018 0.039 0.139 0.032 0.042 0.004 0.077 0.251 1.000 
Note: Reported figures are correlation coefficients. The shaded cells indicate that the correlation is greater than 0.15.
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Table A5: Result of Polychoric Factor Analysis (Principal Factor Method) 
 
F1:  
LPT 
F2: 
AC 
F3: 
P&C 
F4: 
HW&E 
F5: 
HR&P 
F6 F7 F8 F9 F10 
6) No display of national flag 0.915 0.139 0.050 0.024 0.058 0.116 0.082 −0.016 0.015 0.027 
11) No singing of national anthem 0.875 0.113 −0.027 0.043 0.055 −0.120 −0.083 0.034 −0.023 −0.029 
5) Teachers’ strike 0.419 0.121 0.178 0.277 −0.014 0.327 −0.011 0.014 0.029 0.001 
17) No finishing order 0.299 0.815 0.046 0.071 0.066 0.065 −0.042 0.015 0.050 0.039 
16) No footraces 0.070 0.743 −0.019 −0.019 0.048 −0.047 0.051 −0.022 −0.047 −0.049 
9) Group learning 0.036 −0.095 0.649 0.141 0.104 −0.037 0.002 0.019 −0.026 0.005 
1) Reading before class 0.012 0.178 0.549 −0.141 0.014 0.231 0.031 −0.053 0.076 −0.048 
8) Emergency drill on Sep. 1 0.060 0.047 0.428 0.059 −0.092 −0.027 −0.025 0.200 −0.011 0.033 
15) Target-based evaluation 0.059 0.219 0.391 −0.034 0.006 −0.068 −0.043 0.018 0.062 0.146 
12) Kolkhoz and Sovkhoz 0.154 0.014 −0.045 0.566 0.025 −0.039 0.022 0.014 −0.040 0.011 
7) Kids’ bank 0.057 0.258 0.143 0.491 0.080 0.124 −0.051 0.008 0.100 −0.010 
14) Scale evaluation 0.085 −0.032 0.025 0.392 −0.012 0.001 0.318 0.025 0.024 −0.007 
10) Antidiscrimination education 0.198 0.097 0.057 0.056 0.608 −0.065 −0.053 −0.016 0.041 0.024 
13) School trip to Hiroshima or 
Nagasaki 
0.067 0.153 −0.002 −0.031 0.513 0.077 0.083 0.000 −0.047 −0.046 
3) School assembly on atomic 
bomb day  
0.213 0.148 0.163 0.191 0.370 0.210 0.026 0.175 0.075 0.009 
2) Statue of hard work −0.095 0.117 0.069 0.292 0.184 0.083 0.035 0.034 0.286 0.011 
4) Gender-segregated class 
number 
0.128 −0.194 0.188 0.290 0.227 0.027 0.102 0.216 0.060 −0.020 
Note: Reported figures are rotated factor loadings estimated by polychoric factor analysis using the principal factor 
method with an orthogonal Varimax rotation. The shaded cells indicate the factor loading larger than 0.3. 
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Table A6: Summary Statistics of Alternative “Hidden Curriculum” Variables 
Variable NOBs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Average of dummy variables on educational content/practices 
  G1: Leftist political thought 3,621 0.658 1.000 0.000 4.614
  G2: Anti-competition 3,621 0.251 1.000 0.000 6.861
  G3: Participation & cooperation 3,621 1.624 1.000 0.000 3.660
  G4: Human rights & peace 3,621 1.014 1.000 0.000 3.138
Factor score (obtained by the polychoric factor analysis using the principle factor method in Table A5) 
  F1: Leftist political thought 3,621 0.153 1.000 −0.849 4.563
  F2: Anti-competition 3,621 −0.211 1.000 −2.312 7.634
  F3: Participation & cooperation 3,621 1.741 1.000 −0.468 3.945
  F4: Hard work & effort 3,621 1.357 1.000 −1.192 4.617
  F5: Human rights & peace 3,621 1.044 1.000 −0.797 3.435
  F6 3,621 −0.595 1.000 −4.914 4.997
  F7 3,621 1.035 1.000 −3.738 5.113
  F8 3,621 0.756 1.000 −2.800 3.861
  F9 3,621 0.304 1.000 −2.436 3.269
  F10 3,621 0.002 1.000 −4.556 3.858
Notes: All variables are standardized to have a standard deviation of unity, for ease of 
comparison. Because variables regarding “Hard work & effort” have low correlation 
coefficients (Table A4), they are controlled directly without grouping and averaging. 
 
 
